Abstract
Introduction
Virtual teams are groups of geographically and/or temporally dispersed individuals brought together via information and telecommunication technologies (DeSanctis and Poole 1997; Jarvenpaa and Leidner 1999; Lipnack and Stamps 1997; Powell et al. 2004) . Using available technology, individual contributions can be melded together without the expense and trouble of relocating members. Virtual teams can be temporary and focused on the completion of a specific project, or they can be long lasting, with stable membership over several months or years (Duarte and Snyder 1999; Lipnack and Stamps 1997; Townsend et al. 1998 ).
Virtual teams have the potential to deliver unique strategic flexibility by enabling the rapid formation and disbanding of teams comprised of the best talent available (Lipnack and Stamps 1997; Townsend et al. 1998) . But these new organizational forms may also have a dark side (Victor and Stephens 1994) . Some theorists have suggested that the dispersion of team members may engender low levels of trust and cooperation (Handy 1995; Nohria and Eccles 1992) that hamper a team's ability to perform adequately (Iacono and Weisband 1997) . Recent research has sought to uncover the antecedents of team trust in the virtual context (Iacono and Weisband 1997; Jarvenpaa et al. 1998; Jarvenpaa and Leidner 1999) . We extend this line of inquiry and concentrate on a specific managerial intervention, behavior control, and its effects on trust in temporary virtual teams.
Behavior control interventions are widely used in colocated teams (Henderson and Lee 1992; Kirsch 1997) and their use has been proposed for virtual teams as well (Townsend et al. 1998) . Exploratory studies of virtual teams have shown that trust can indeed emerge in zero-history temporary teams with geographically and temporally dispersed members, while also showing that it can rapidly degrade and deteriorate (Jarvenpaa et al. 1998; Jarvenpaa and Leidner 1999) . But early work has focused on selfdirected virtual teams 2 and to date no attention has been devoted to the antecedents of trust decline and to the effects of managerial controls on trust in virtual teams (Powell et al. 2004) . Our work provides a first attempt to fill this void. Our results indicate that behavior control mechanisms increase vigilance and make more salient instances when individuals perceive that team members have failed to uphold their obligations (i.e., reneging and incongruence). As a consequence they increase the odds that such incidents will be detected, and the likelihood of trust decline.
This article has four sections. The first section describes the theoretical underpinning of the study, followed by the second section describing the research methodology and data analysis procedures. The third section describes the quantitative and qualitative results of the study. The paper concludes with a discussion of the findings, limitations, and implications for future research and practice.
Theoretical Framework

Dynamics of Trust Decline
Team trust in the virtual environment is defined as the belief that an "individual or group (a) makes good-faith efforts to behave in accordance with any commitments both explicit and implicit, (b) is honest in whatever negotiations preceded such commitment and (c) does not take excessive advantage of another even when the opportunity is available" (Cummings and Bromley 1996, p. 303) . Thus, individuals trust teammates who are perceived to be honestly and reliably attempting to fulfill their commitments to the team (Mayer et al. 1995) . In virtual teams, trust is argued to be rooted in perceptions of teammates' ability, benevolence, and integrity (Jarvenpaa et al. 1998) . Ability refers to the aptitude and skills that enable an individual to be perceived as competent by teammates (Jarvenpaa et al. 1998; Mayer et al. 1995) . Benevolence refers to the extent to which an individual is believed to be willing to help teammates beyond personal motives or individual gain. Thus, a belief that teammates are concerned with the well-being and success of the team, and that they consciously avoid disrupting the project even when they may benefit directly, engenders perceptions of benevolence (Jarvenpaa et al. 2 Self-directed teams are defined as "groups of interdependent individuals that can self-regulate their behavior on relatively whole tasks" (Cohen and Ledford 1994, p. 13) . Most notably, self-directed teams retain control over organization of work and are able to determine work assignment, work methods, and scheduling of activities.
1998; Mayer et al. 1995) . Integrity refers to the extent to which an individual is believed to adhere to a set of principles thought to make her dependable and reliable. Thus, evidence that teammates have a solid work ethic, a strong sense of justice, and over time act in a manner consistent with these values fosters perceptions of integrity (Jarvenpaa et al. 1998; Mayer et al. 1995) . Conversely, evidence that teammates behave inconsistently and that their actions contradict their own words hinders perceptions of integrity (Robinson 1996) .
The literature on psychological contracts offers a useful starting point for the investigation of trust decline in virtual teams, since the breach of a psychological contract has been empirically linked to trust decline in colocated environments (Robinson 1996; Rousseau 1989) . A psychological contract is defined as an "individual's beliefs about the terms and conditions of a reciprocal exchange agreement between the person and another party" (Robinson 1996, p. 575) . Such contracts can be implicit and are defined in terms of individual perceptions (Morrison and Robinson 1997) . When a virtual team is formed, teammates must communicate to evaluate the project requirements, make decisions regarding process and content, and provide feedback on one another's work. As the working relationship unfolds, team members develop expectations about individual workload, work processes, and individual contributions. As expectations arise about reciprocal obligations between teammates, a psychological contract is formed (Rousseau 2001) .
Psychological contract breach, defined as an individual's belief that one's counterparts have failed to meet their obligations, is triggered by reneging or incongruence. Reneging occurs when others, recognizing that an obligation exists, "knowingly fail to follow through on that obligation" (Morrison and Robinson 1997, p. 233) . Incongruence arises when the perception of obligations differ between some team members and the individual responsible for meeting them. Incongruence differs from reneging in that the individual who fails to follow through on her obligations does so unknowingly rather than deliberately. But incongruence, like reneging, leads to observable behaviors that are inconsistent with teammates' expectations (Morrison and Robinson 1997) . 3 Contract breach has been found to damage two important antecedents of trust: judgments of integrity and beliefs about benevolence (Robinson 1996) . Trust is predicated on the belief that others will make good-faith efforts to honor their commitments (Cummings and Bromley 1996) and have consideration for others' well-being (Gambetta 1988) . Early work lends support to the notion that integrity and benevolence are important components of trust in virtual teams (Jarvenpaa et al. 1998) . As virtual team members interact, individuals form beliefs about teammates' benevolence and integrity. If the interaction reveals that teammates have reneged on their obligations, judgments of integrity are revised and beliefs about teammate's benevolence are undermined (Robinson 1996) . Incongruence-based incidents may also foster the perception that teammates have little interest in the success of the team and are not dependable, thus leading to a negative reassessment of beliefs about their benevolence and integrity. Furthermore, when reneging or incongruence occur, individuals tend to make attributions of malevolence, thus leading to the conclusion that teammates are not willing to respect their commitments and that trust has been misplaced (Robinson 1996) . We, therefore, propose:
Hypothesis 1a: Trust declines in virtual teams that experience reneging.
Hypothesis 1b: Trust declines in virtual teams that experience incongruence.
Because of the perceptual nature of breach of psychological contracts, it is not enough that reneging or incongruence occur for trust to decline; failures to fulfill mutual obligations must also be detected and recognized (Morrison and Robinson 1997) . Whether individuals actually perceive a discrepancy between teammates' obligations and actual behavior depends on their vigilance and the salience of that discrepancy. Vigilance represents how closely individuals monitor their counterparts' actions (Morrison and Robinson 1997) . Thus, vigilance is an active behavior that team members engage in when they scrutinize whether or not teammates are fulfilling their obligations to the team. Theorists hypothesize that vigilance intensifies when the costs associated with an unfulfilled promise are significant (e.g., the team is penalized for failing to produce required deliverables) and when there is significant uncertainty about whether obligations will be fulfilled (e.g., as a deadline approaches teammates have yet to deliver expected work) (Morrison and Robinson 1997) . When vigilance is high, any instance of reneging or incongruence is more likely to be readily detected (Morrison and Robinson 1997 ).
Hypothesis 2a: Vigilance intensifies the negative effect of reneging and/or incongruence on trust.
Salience is defined as the degree to which a stimulus stands out from its context (Fiske and Taylor 1984) . Thus, salience is defined as a characteristic (e.g., strength) of an instance of reneging or incongruence-not as a behavior in which the individual engages (i.e., vigilance). The degree of salience is affected by the magnitude of the discrepancy between perceived obligations and actual teammates' behavior (e.g., repeated calls for contributions go unanswered), by how vivid mutual obligations are for one or more team members (e.g., the obligation was recently or unequivocally set), or by the importance an individual ascribes to the obligation (Morrison and Robinson 1997) . When any instance of reneging or incongruence is highly salient, the incident is more likely to be readily detected (Morrison and Robinson 1997 
Behavior Control and Trust Decline
Control theory, as originally conceptualized, focused on the organization as the unit of analysis and addressed broad-based organizational control structures (Eisenhardt 1985; Ouchi 1979) . More recently, it has been adopted to study smaller work units, such as project teams (Guinan et al. 1998; Henderson and Lee 1992; Kirsch 1997) . Following Kirsch (1997) , we conceptualize control as attempts to ensure that individuals working on organizational projects act in conformity with predefined strategies. Thus, control is exercised via mechanisms that, when successfully implemented, lead to the regulation of behavior (Kirsch 1997) . Formal control mechanisms are classified into behavior and outcome controls. Behavior control mechanisms-the focus of this study-are designed to structure the transformation process of work, whereas outcome controls tie incentives directly to the outcomes of work activities (Ouchi 1977; Snell 1992) . "In behavior control, specific rules and procedures are articulated, which, if followed, will lead to desired outcomes" (Kirsch 1997, p. 217) . In colocated teams, behavior control mechanisms are used to stimulate team performance, foster cooperation, and improve individual psychosocial outcomes (Henderson and Lee 1992; Pinto et al. 1993) . Typical behavior control mechanisms include the definition of explicit work assignments, the specification of rules and procedures, and the filing of project plans and project reports (Henderson and Lee 1992; Kirsch 1997; Pinto et al. 1993) .
By their very nature, behavior control mechanisms reward compliance with the given rules and procedures (Snell 1992) . As a consequence, teams are likely to pay significant attention to the requirements and the associated deadlines. Behavior control mechanisms increase team members' vigilance and make perceived evidence that team members have failed to uphold their obligations (i.e., reneging and incongruence) salient. 4 Salience and vigilance moderate the relationship between these incidents and trust decline. Thus, when reneging or incongruence occur in virtual teams complying with behavior control, they are more likely to be detected. As a consequence, virtual teams in which behavior control is used experience significant trust decline. The research model is depicted in Figure 1 . 4 The failure by teammates to fulfill their obligation may be real (reneging) or perceived by some team members (incongruence).
Research Methods
We tested the research hypotheses through an experiment employing a two-group pretestposttest design with 51 virtual teams of three and four members.
5
Subjects
A total of 201 graduate (89 percent) and undergraduate (11 percent) students from six schools in the United States, Europe, and New Zealand were involved in the research. On average, they were 28.1 years old and had 5.1 years of work experience. About 10 percent of respondents reported having been a member of a virtual team in the past. Subjects were randomly assigned to teams, with the only restriction being that no two members could be geographically colocated. Teams were then randomly assigned to treatments.
Procedures
Following a preliminary survey in which background, experience, and demographic information were collected, the teams completed a three-week long preliminary exercise. This was designed to familiarize participants with the communication and collaboration infrastructure, and with the nature of virtual teamwork. All teams were required to produce a four-page report outlining their analysis of an online case study. Upon completion of the preliminary exercise, the teams completed the pretest questionnaire and immediately began working on the main project: the development of a business plan for a new Internet-enabled venture (Figure 2) . 6 This project, a research and planning task used in previous virtual team research (Jarvenpaa and Leidner 1999) , is well suited for our investigation because it requires considerable interaction among teammates and the extensive communication and coordination of effort typical of virtual teams (Furst et al. 1999) . A substantial portion of each student's final course grade (20 to 25 percent) was assigned to the project and a prize of U.S. $750 was offered to each of the two teams that produced the best business plan.
Communication took place in each team's private communication hub.
Each hub, accessible through password authentication, provided a private distribution list that broadcast e-mail messages to all team members, an asynchronous threaded discussion board, a synchronous chat room, and a shared document repository. Each team could freely select its own communication media portfolio.
The behavior control mechanisms applied in this study mirror those often used in colocated teams. The teams in the treatment group were required to file weekly reports documenting their long-term and short-term plans, identifying members responsible for completion of specific tasks, and reporting on the progress made during the previous week. The teams' compliance with the above procedures accounted for 20 percent of each team's final project grade. Members of teams in the control group were required to file an individual report upon completion of the exercise so as to ensure a balanced workload between the treatment and control groups (e.g., all teams had to write reports), and to maintain a consistent grading structure (e.g., all teams were rewarded for writing required reports).
Manipulation Check
The members of teams in the treatment group recognized the reporting requirement (t = 52.44; p = .000) and all treatment teams submitted all the required weekly reports except for two teams that skipped one report each. Participants were asked to report the extent to which they engaged in planning, task assignment, and progress revision.
Figure 2. Projects and Data Collection Timeline
The members of the behavior control group reported engaging in these activities significantly more than the self-directed group: all three behaviors were successfully increased (F = 8.764, p = .003; F = 3.941, p = .049; F = 6.455, p = .012 respectively).
Analysis
This study uses a multi-method approach: Through case analyses, we evaluate the effects of reneging and incongruence on trust (H1a; H1b), the moderating effect of vigilance and salience (H2a; H2b), and the effect of behavior control on vigilance and salience (H3a; H3b). Through statistical analysis of team trust at pre-and posttest we evaluate the effect of behavior control on trust in the virtual environment (H4). The advantages of blending qualitative and quantitative analysis approaches are now widely recognized (Kaplan and Duchon 1988; Mingers 2001) . In this study, the multi-method approach minimizes the threat of mono-method variance, enables us to evaluate overt behaviors rather than relying on self-reports, and allows us to chart the effects of interactions among teammates over time.
Data Display and Measures
We measured trust using a previously validated scale (Jarvenpaa and Leidner 1999) . The scale loaded satisfactorily on one factor and demonstrated adequate reliability on both the pretest (α = .85) and posttest (α = .89). The data show strong perceptual agreement at pretest and posttest measurement (r wg(j) = .92 and .90 respectively) and were aggregated at the team level. We made inferences about individual judgments of benevolence and integrity from participants' explicit behavior and statements. A statement that captures an individual's perception that teammates are disrupting the project, or that they are putting personal interests before those of the team, was construed to be evidence of lowered benevolence assessment. A statement that captures an individual's perception that teammates are unreliable was construed to be evidence of lowered integrity assessment.
After coding the team transcripts of selected cases, we created time-ordered matrices in order to reveal the sequence and flow of events in each team (Miles and Huberman 1994) . The coding and data reduction process, as well as a description of the data displays used in the analysis, are reported in Appendix A. Reneging, incongruence, vigilance, and salience were measured by analyzing the communication logs of selected teams. An instance of reneging was recorded when one or more team members knew about their obligations (e.g., had explicitly taken responsibility for specific contributions or had acknowledged their responsibility) and failed to deliver on them. Evidence of incongruence was found in a pattern of codes indicating that a misunderstanding of obligations between one or more of the team members had occurred. The time stamp associated with the incident was the day in the life of the team when the incident became apparent (e.g., contributions due for a specific date are not produced on that day). A pattern of codes indicating that one or more team members were actively monitoring teammates' behavior (e.g., a team member inquires with others about the status of the latters' missing contributions) provided evidence of team members' vigilance. A pattern of codes indicating that an unfulfilled contribution was significant (e.g., because of its cost to the team), vivid (e.g., because repeated calls drew attention to it), or personally relevant to one or more team members provided evidence of the salience of incidents.
Selection of Cases
Ten cases were extracted from the population of 51 teams. In the case selection stage, we followed the logic of theoretical replication whereby cases are not chosen at random or through statistical sampling, but based on expectations grounded in theory (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1994) . Cases that are expected to produce contrary results but for predictable reasons are chosen in order to rule out competing explanations of the observed phenomenon (Yin 1994) . Support for the research hypotheses is claimed if the case evidence is consistent with the hypothesized pattern.
The four cases that exhibit the highest negative trust differential between pre-and posttest measurements (Teams 41T td , 40T td , 4C td and 26C td 7 ) provide the basis for testing H1 and H2. While these four cases were selected without regard to team control structure, two cases in each treatment qualified for selection. Cases that were expected to produce contrary results, but for predictable reasons, were then selected: the teams with the highest posttest trust in each group were used (teams 15C ht and 50T ht ).
Theoretical replication was also used to guide the selection of four cases addressing H3. H3a and H3b propose an explanation of how and why behavior control mechanisms are responsible for trust decline-a result established through statistical analysis (H4). Four teams that experienced maximally different (Eisenhardt 1989 ) trust change between pre-and posttest measurements (teams 44T bc , 33T bc , 19T bc and 24T bc ) were extracted in pairs so that the two teams in each pair had similar pretest trust but divergent posttest trust (see Table 2 ). H3 focuses on the role of behavior control in trust decline; therefore, only cases from the treatment group were selected.
The selection process and the number of cases selected in this research are consistent with earlier work in virtual teams (Jarvenpaa and Leidner 1999) and colocated teams (Gersick 1989) .
Results
Challenges to Trust Maintenance in Virtual Teams
We hypothesize that instances of reneging (H1a) and incongruence (H1b) lead to trust decline when vigilance (H2a) or salience (H2b) are high. The four teams that experienced the most significant trust decline during the completion of the business plan provide substantial evidence of both reneging and incongruence (see Table 1 ). Each of these incidents is associated with high vigilance and/or salience. We report some exemplars in the remainder of this section.
Evidence of Reneging
Team 4C td experiences early reneging and incongruence incidents but, after settling on one project idea and dividing responsibility for its completion, all team members engage in research and provide feedback to each other over a nineday period. Suddenly, Sam stops participating and 7 We use the suffix T to refer to treatment group teams and C to refer to control group teams. We also use the subscript td to refer to trust decline teams, ht to refer to high-trust teams, and bc to refer to teams used to study the effects of behavior control. The last column represents the percentage of instances of reneging and incongruence that occurred during the last 12 days of the project (i.e., the last third of the project duration).
Lower numbers indicate higher trust. Dan's reneging appears to be highly salient to his teammates because of its magnitude (e.g., "this is extremely unfair to the rest of the team"). Dan leaves the team four days before the final deadline, at a time when attention to the project and contributions to the final deliverable are at a peak (see Figure 4) 
High Trust Teams
In the previous two sections we have shown how reneging and incongruence are prevalent in teams that suffered trust decline (H1a and H1b) and how these incidents are either highly salient (H2b) and/or detected by vigilant team members (H2a). Our explanation for the causes of trust decline in virtual teams suggests that high trust can be maintained under two circumstances: Either the team experiences no reneging and incongruence, or the incidents go undetected due to their low salience and low vigilance by team members. An examination of the logs of the high trust teams lends support to these expectations. While the team meets biweekly in the chat room throughout the project, teammates spend more than half the allocated time simply debating the merits of preliminary ideas and making little progress. But after selecting an idea and subdividing the work (on day 22), Team 50T ht progressively picks up the pace and experiences no further reneging or incongruence (see Figure 3) . A sense of urgency never pervades this team, but as the final deadline approaches all teammates contribute significantly to the project, debating inconsistencies and other unresolved issues before separating until the next meeting. For example, between two scheduled chat meetings, Ted sends an e-mail titled "URGENT!!!" in which he explains why the advertising plan they have developed will not work. He details an alternative and asks for input. By the end of his working day, he receives an answer from each teammate.
These results lend support to H1 and H2. The teams where trust declined experience substantial reneging and incongruence. These incidents are detected because of their salience and/or high vigilance by team members at the time. When Note:
Teams that experienced trust decline appear below the solid horizontal line. High trust teams appear above the solid horizontal line. The vertical line marks the last third of the project duration.
Figure 3. Plot of Incongruence and Reneging Incidents Over Time
individuals witness reneging or incongruence, they lower their assessment of teammates' benevolence and integrity, and trust declines as a consequence. Conversely, the high trust teams either do not experience reneging and incongruence or, when they do, the failure to fulfill obligations has little effect on trust due to its low salience and teammates' low vigilance. As shown in Figure 3 , the timing of incidents, not just their occurrence, may help explain our results. Teams where trust declined experience a substantial portion of their incidents during the latter third of the project, a time when high trust teams experience no incidents (see Table 1 ). Late in the project, as the deadline for completion approaches, team members are likely to become highly vigilant due to the increasing cost of unfulfilled obligations. At this time, any reneging and incongruence is also more likely salient because mutual obligations are increasingly vivid and relevant to team members. Thus, incidents that occur later in the project, when team members are generally more active (see Figure 4 ), may have a disproportionate effect on trust decline.
Behavior Control and Trust Decline
The analysis of trust scores at pre-and posttest provides support for H4 and the proposition that, on average, behavior control negatively affects trust in virtual teams. No significant pretest trust difference was detected (p = 0.449). After controlling for pretest trust, teams under behavior control report significantly lower posttest trust than their self-directed counterparts (Table 3 ).
Within each group (i.e., behavior control and selfdirected teams), trust evolved differently during the main project. On average, individuals in selfdirected teams did not revise their assessment of trust. Conversely, teams under behavior control experienced a significant decline in trust (Table 4) .
Behavior Control's Impact on Vigilance and Salience
We hypothesized that behavior control would increase team members' vigilance (H3a) and the Source: For each day, averages are computed by dividing the total number of e-mail messages sent by all teams in the treatment or control group, by the number of teams in the group.
salience of incidents (H3b). Behavior controls periodically drew team members' attention to their work progress and most teams paced their work around the requirement to file four weekly reports. While the magnitude of communication in the treatment group is generally in line with that of the control group, it increased substantially in the vicinity of the report deadline (Figure 4 ). This pattern of communication suggests that behavior control acted as a catalyst, drawing attention to the project and spurring team members to take action. Such heightened attention appears to engender more vigilance by team members and increase the salience of incidents.
Analyses of the communication logs of teams that experienced trust decline during the main project provides evidence of behavior control-induced vigilance. After only receiving Sid's contribution, and being unable to read it due to a virus, he files the second report: "I have submitted the report. Go to the web site to have a look. Some feedback and discussion on this assignment would facilitate a better end result. Look forward to hearing from you all and receiving some input."
8 In this section, we focus our attention on critical incidents that stem from the implementation of behavior control. This narrow focus could convey the false impression that these teams were mostly focused on, and communicating about, the reporting requirement.
To the contrary, these teams discussed topics and issues similar to those reported above, but we only report excerpts relating to the reporting requirements.
Pat 43 14 "I apologize for the delay with my contribution." He then provides it in the form of an e-mail message.
Al 46 18 "Pat, thanks. Can you shape these to fit the appropriate section of the report format? …Sid, still hoping to receive your work [virus free]. As usual, we are running short on time, so can you also shape your work to fit the appropriate heading in the report format?….Max, anything to add?"
As each report deadline nears, it is apparent that Al is vigilant and monitors his teammates. He repeatedly calls on them to produce their contributions (e.g., "get your stuff to me asap" [37] ; "Sid, still hoping to receive your work….Max, anything to add?" [46] ). When Al is preparing to file the reports, he actively looks for expected teammates contributions.
In Team 44T bc the reporting schedule influences the pace of work activities as well. Some team members are very aware of the cost of missing a report (e.g., Art, asking for clarification to the coordinator, states: "I just want to make sure we do not miss any deadlines"). 
Behavior Control in High Trust Teams
In our study, teams that successfully maintained or improved trust while complying with behavior control represent the exception. In these teams, the control mechanisms did increase vigilance. But like the other high trust teams, they either experienced minimal reneging or incongruence (Team 33T bc ) or experienced few incidents, most concentrated early on in the team's life (Team 24T bc ).
In summary, behavior control mechanisms do appear to increase team members' vigilance and the salience of reneging and incongruence incidents the team experiences during the project. In so doing, they increase the likelihood that these incidents will be detected and lead to trust decline. Conversely, in teams that experience no incidents, or that only experience some early incidents, behavior control has no detectable effect on trust.
Discussion
Previous research suggests that virtual teams are able to rapidly achieve a relatively high level of trust (Iacono and Weisband 1997; Jarvenpaa et al. 1998; Jarvenpaa and Leidner 1999) . As early trust can be established, the challenge then is to maintain it while the team moves toward completion of the project (Meyerson et al. 1996) . Our results provide important clues about the determinants of trust decline in the virtual environment and, in particular, about the effect of behavior controls on trust.
Reneging and incongruence plagued all virtual teams where trust declined. In these teams, high vigilance by some team members and/or the salience of the incidents made them easily detec- Other high trust teams did experience some reneging and incongruence (24T bc and 50T ht ). These teams started their work with a ramp-up period during which all teammates contributed sporadically to the project. Incidents were concentrated during this time, a time when the project appeared to be a low priority for all team members. However, after this initial period, the teams transitioned to a second phase characterized by high involvement by all team members when incidents did not occur. As a consequence, the few instances of reneging and incongruence that happened early on appeared to go largely undetected, or were regarded as minor, and had no negative impact on trust.
An important insight emerging from this study pertains to the timing of reneging and incongruence-based incidents. On average, the four high trust teams experienced 7 percent of their total incidents during the latter third of the project duration. 9 During the same time, the six teams in which trust declined experienced, on average, 50 percent of their total incidents. We conclude that, as the final deadline nears, when attention to the project is at a peak and incidents are most likely to be detected, reneging and incongruence may have the strongest impact on trust decline. Future research should explicitly test this proposition.
Behavior control had, on average, a negative effect on trust in the temporary virtual teams in this study because it tended to increase the salience of incidents caused by reneging and incongruence and made some individuals more vigilant. By stimulating a discussion of progress to date, individual contributions, and future plans, the weekly reporting requirement periodically drew individuals' attention to individual performance relative to mutual obligations and highlighted differential contribution and failure to fulfill these obligations by some team members.
Specific behavior control mechanisms were the focus of this study, but other mechanisms may contribute to heighten team members' vigilance and increase the salience of reneging and incongruence. Self-directed teams chose varied approaches to self-regulation. For example, in one team (Team 4C td ), one member attempted to heavily structure the team's interaction process by proposing deadlines and individual work assignments. As with the behavior control teams, these requirements appear to have stimulated increased salience and vigilance, and to have contributed to trust decline.
Limitations
The study's limitations must be recognized before results are interpreted. This study focuses on temporary virtual teams in an experimental setting. Generalization to other contexts, such as ongoing or longer-term virtual teams, should be done with caution. Teammates in this study had no expectation of long-term affiliation with the organization and they were likely unconcerned with their long-term reputation with teammates and others involved in the project. Replication of this study in environments where members of 9 Of the four teams, three experienced no incidents and one experienced only one incident during this time temporary virtual teams have a permanent affiliation with an organization is needed.
We adopted behavior control mechanisms commonly used in traditional teams. Nonetheless, we only implemented a subset of the possible behavior controls available to management. While any control mechanism that increases salience and vigilance may have a negative effect on trust, our results may not be readily generalized to forms of control we did not explicitly investigate. More importantly, we did not provide explicit training as to how to manage the behavior control mechanisms and enforced strict deadlines. These choices maximized the impact of the control mechanisms, but may not be representative of real work environments where reporting deadlines are generally more fluid. Finally, we inferred individual and private judgments of benevolence and integrity from participants' explicit behavior and statements. We believe that pursuing the chain of causality and investigating the components of trust, despite imperfect measures, provides a significant addition to the current literature. Future research should seek to corroborate our results with different measures (e.g., selfreported perceptual data) in an effort to provide more precision.
Implications and Conclusions
Our work brings a new theoretical perspective to the study of trust in virtual teams and describes processes by which trust deteriorates in virtual environments. Our results show that incongruence and reneging play an important role in trust decline. In the virtual environment, the obstacles to effective communication, the failure to recognize the coexistence of different communication habits and constraints, the inability to overcome preconceived frameworks about how teamwork should be accomplished, and the inability to simultaneously attend to both local obligations and requests from distant teammates, all may provide fertile ground for incongruence. Recent research demonstrates that the lack of face-to-face communication in virtual teams tends to hinder orderly and efficient information exchange (Galegher and Kraut 1994; Hightower et al. 1997) . Thus, as virtual team members communicate about mutual responsibilities and obligations, incongruent perceptions of their commitments may develop, creating the potential for trust decline.
Early work on leadership (Kayworth et al. 2001) and individual roles in the virtual environment (Vogel et al. 2001) , suggests that virtual teams benefit from the designation of a team member responsible for ensuring regular, detailed, and prompt communication, as well as communicating individual role relationships and responsibilities. Arguably, the designation of a team member who is exclusively focused on minimizing the threat of incongruence by being responsible for creating shared understanding and for circulating accurate information to all team members will contribute to sustaining a high level of trust among teammates. Future research aimed at investigating the determinants of incongruence in the virtual environment is needed.
Early virtual team theorists have suggested that high levels of trust are maintained in virtual teams that engage in continuous and frequent interaction. This research indicates that the members of high performing teams pressured each other to move quickly and "everyone submitted to that pressure," contributing their "most intense efforts several days before each deadline" (Iacono and Weisband 1997, p. 8) . Our results confirm these early findings and indicate that teams where all members provide substantial contributions, particularly near deadlines when vigilance and salience are likely heightened, minimize the occurrence of reneging and incongruence-based incidents and maintain high trust.
We have limited the scope of our work and have hypothesized a direct link between incidents rooted in reneging and incongruence, and trust decline. Future research should build on our work and further explain the process by which detected incidents lead to individuals' revision of teammates' benevolence and integrity assessments.
Some unanswered questions raised by our research include the following: What is the effect of the timing of incidents on trust decline? It appears that incidents that occur near important deadlines are more likely to be detected and have a disproportionate effect on trust decline. What is the effect of past teammates' behavior on the detection and interpretation of incidents? It appears that team members will more closely monitor teammates that have proven unreliable in the past and, as a consequence, will be more likely to detect their reneging. Prior witnessed behavior is used to make attributions about the intentions behind current witnessed behavior (Kelley 1973 Finally, our results regarding the negative impact of behavior control suggest an important, and distressing, dynamic. Managerial interventions that focus individuals' attention on deadlines and work progress-the very intervention that is designed to mitigate communication and coordination problems-can promote trust decline. These findings indicate that managers charged with the task of ensuring the success of virtual teams sit on the horns of a dilemma. They may allow the team to self-direct, and accept whatever positive or negative outcomes the team will be able to achieve on its own; alternatively, they can intervene and risk creating the premises for trust decline. Note that this dilemma does not only pertain to the control mechanisms we studied; rather, any managerial intervention that increases salience and vigilance may contribute to weaken virtual team trust.
This potential outcome is important because it runs counter to expectations based on an extension of the traditional team literature. Others have warned against "the assumption that previous theory and practice on traditional group processes and outcomes easily generalize to the virtual environment" and call for empirical testing of this assumption (Furst et al. 1999, p. 251) . Our research provides evidence that generally adopted managerial practices may not suit the idiosyncrasies of the virtual environment. Virtual teams, composed of dispersed members often in different time zones, experience communication and coordination difficulties with which traditional teams do not have to contend (Powell et al. 2004 ). For example, virtual team members never meet by chance and generally cannot quickly gather to discuss issues. As a consequence, control mechanisms that require considerable interaction and coordination may constrain the team's ability to fall into the rhythm of communication that best fits the team's structural and process elements (Maznevski and Chudoba 2000) . Under these circumstances, control mechanisms may themselves become a source of reneging and incongruencebased incidents and, because of their effect on salience and vigilance, make these incidents easily detectable. Thus, simply porting management practices and control tools used in traditional teams to the virtual environment may be ineffective, even counterproductive.
Our results provide empirical confirmation for concerns voiced by others (DeSanctis and Poole 1997; Malone and Laubacher 1998; Victor and Stephens 1994) . Future research should focus on developing prescriptions for effective virtual team designs. Information systems researchers, with their understanding of new technology, adoption and appropriation processes, organizational structures, and social systems, are well positioned to explore novel approaches to virtual team design. For example, recent work posits that a virtual team will experience superior coordination and performance if members are decoupled-decreasing the need for synchronized efforts and extensive communication-rather than following the meeting patterns of traditional teams (Ramesh and Dennis 2002) . Complementing recent contributions, our research highlights the need for a richer understanding of managerial control in virtual teams and, we believe, provides both theoretical and methodological direction for future work.
Time order matrices, identifying the message number as column heading and the message sender as row heading, were used to reveal the sequence and flow of events in each team. The codes associated with each message were inserted at the intersections. This display allows for visual scanning of each team's overall pattern of codes over time (e.g., teammates' agreement on the need to produce individual contributions by a certain date, the actual contributions provided at the agreed upon date, and the reaction by various team members) and easy identification of potential trust threatening incidents. The first step in this identification process consisted of extracting instances when expected contributions were not delivered, or when individuals reacted to teammates' response (or lack thereof) to an earlier expectation. The identified instances were used to create critical incidents charts (Miles and Huberman 1994) with pointers to the related messages and memos.
Next, each critical incident was analyzed by reviewing all messages and memos related to the incident and evaluating how expectations came to form, how team members' responded to the expectations, and the outcome of the interaction. The analysis was designed to determine whether the interaction was indicative of reneging (i.e., conscious failure to meet an obligation) or incongruence (i.e., different perceptions about mutual obligations) and to evaluate its impact on trust. Finally, we verified whether these patterns were unique to trust-decline cases and if, and how, they differed from those detected in the high-trust cases. This strategy allowed us to isolate trust-threatening incidents and evaluate the impact of these incidents across the theoretical sample of cases.
